2 became professionalized and specialized. It was a second -and institutional -Scientific Revolution to finish the task left undone by the first. Science during the nineteenth century became industrial and took its place in forging British economic supremacy. This was a global big picture of institutional progress to match the intellectual march of mind. This story of nineteenth-century science as largely pragmatic consolidation and institutionalization now rings no more true than does the old view of the Scientific Revolution. Institutions certainly mattered a great deal to nineteenth-century protagonists, but there was nothing consensual or inevitable about the way they emerged. Far from it. There was probably as much blood spilt during the nineteenth century over the reform of the Royal Society or the proprieties of scientific education as there was over natural selection or the existence or otherwise of the luminferous ether.
Surveying the debates raging around the Royal Society and its constitution from the 1820s to the end of the 1840s allows us to cast a revealing light on the perils of over-easy generalization. The consensus until relatively recently has been that fairly straightforward homologies could be drawn between science, professionalization and reform. It seemed unproblematic that battles to reform the Royal Society could be read off as the campaign of the properly scientific Fellows to turn the society into a professional body. 6 Whig historians on the one hand have seemed to regard the eventual shape of a reformed Royal Society as a self-evident goal, its structures mirroring those of modern, professionalized science. Tory historians, on the other hand, have described the reform battles in terms of the practical efforts of pragmatic men to respond to particular local circumstances. Whilst certainly rather more sophisticated than its Whig counterpart, the Tory approach still takes as uncontentious the parallel linkage of science, professionalization and reform. 7 By overlooking the nuances that defined competing positions, both sides in the debate lost sight of the ideological battle lines that divided the warring parties. Rather than regarding professionalization (or science, for that matter) as defining particular positions, historians are now more inclined to treat them as the contingent outcomes of debate. 
I

Diffusion and its Discontents
One important consequence of this fracturing of our understanding of the location of nineteenth-century scientific authority has been a re-evaluation of the old, diffusionist account of the movement of scientific knowledge through society and, as a result, a reassessment of the notion of popular science. 12 In the diffusionist account, scientific knowledge was produced and owned by a trained, disciplined elite. Popular science was a watered-down affair, repackaged and made comprehensible to the masses. As a result, it was of little interest to respectable historians of science, being regarded as little more than post facto vulgarization for the hoi polloi. Nowadays, on the contrary, nineteenth-century institutions aimed at bringing scientific knowledge to different and broader audiences are regarded as being active, knowledge-producing centres in their own right rather than being anodyne purveyors of codified and settled knowledge for the uninitiated. They are regarded instead as being at the heart of the nineteenth-century science wars where rival notions of how and by whom knowledge should be produced were hashed out and promulgated. Looking at institutions of popular science, from the Royal Institution to the Royal Polytechnic, has led to an important decentering in our understanding of the locus of scientific authority in nineteenth-century
Britain. It was both everywhere and nowhere.
The gentlemen of science themselves were certainly keen to overcome the fragmentation of scientific authority that characterized the first half of the nineteenth century.
Many of the institutions they either established or attempted to co-opt for their own purposes, were designed to promote their own meritocratic vision of science as the province of a nature's legitimate spokesmen were. It laid out the training and the disciplined set of mind that a true philosopher needed. 13 The British Association for the Advancement of Science has been widely interpreted as an instrument to impose gentlemanly hegemony on a broader scientific public. 14 Concerted efforts were made to define its remit, to police what could and could not be discussed on its platforms and to impose gentlemanly standards of behaviour.
Repeated efforts to reform the Royal Society may be understood as attempts to wrest power in that crucial scientific institution from an old guard that meritocratic young Turks such as
Herschel or Charles Babbage and their acolytes regarded as terminally tainted by old corruption and into the hands of a new disciplined elite. 15 The squabbles amongst the gentlemen of science themselves, over just what they thought reforming the Royal Society meant, is an important reminder as well of just how fragile and contested even that powerful alliance might be.
The gentlemanly vision of measured, meritocratic authority was by no means the only one doing the rounds. Historians now listen to plenty of alternative voices blowing in the wind and to the increasingly strident gentlemanly efforts to stifle those voices. Those efforts in themselves are a good measure of the extent to which alternative views of the locus of scientific authority were feared as real threats to attempted gentlemanly hegemony. Gleeful political radicals mischievously picked up on the latest discoveries in electricity and used them to turn the carefully measured and reformist world of gentlemanly science on its head. there. 19 Any efforts to treat the Mechanics' Institution as a vehicle for diffusing sanitized knowledge to a cowed and grateful working class certainly came to nothing. 20 What becomes visible in the debates that surrounded the new institution is the clear availability of alternative and powerful accounts of scientific authority and proper scientific practice. 21 Gentlemen of science were often painfully aware of just how tentative their grasp on the reins of power was. Even within their most hallowed institutions it was clearly all too easy for things to get away from them. The furore surrounding gentleman electrician Andrew
Crosse right at the beginning of Victoria's reign is a case in point. Crosse, a Somerset landowner with distinctly radical political leanings was publicly lionized at the Bristol meeting of the BAAS in 1836 and held up to the audience as an exemplar of the humble, diffident (and well-behaved) investigator of nature. 22 All the more embarrassing, therefore, Political radicals jumped on the latest evidence that electricity was indeed the stuff of life.
Reports appeared in the press that no less a figure than Michael Faraday, darling of elite metropolitan science, had repeated and endorsed Crosse's experiments. Despite Faraday's own disgusted assertions to the contrary, the reports were still circulating more than a decade
later. An 'infidel lecturer' on Paddington Green during the 1850s, asserted that Faraday had demonstrated the electrical nature of life by producing animalcules and maggots by electrical agency. Faraday had allegedly underlined his experiments with the remark to his audience that: "Gentlemen, there is life, and, for ought I can tell, man was so created." 23 What this suggests, at the very least, is that diffusionism had a politics. Different accounts of where science might legitimately be produced and how it might move around society carried with them their own political baggage. What was once bundled together dismissively under the heading of popular science is now recognized as a variety of efforts, more or less successful, to articulate different visions -with their own politics -of the ways in which scientific authority might be constructed, legitimized and circulated. 24 There was no trickle-down effect in nineteenth-century scientific culture and, insofar as a gentlemanly elite tried to realize one, they found their efforts strongly contested on all sides. When scientific claims and assertions of authority appeared in different contexts and places, rather than reading these as passive mediations from centre to periphery we should recognize them as active and artful appropriations of the mantle of science for a variety of purposes. 25 The different ways in which scientific claims were articulated and defended in a variety of contexts should alert us to just how flexible and indexical a term science was for much of the century. Different groups and individuals with their own axes to grind fashioned themselves and their sciences in a range of distinct ways. 
II
Reframing the Boundaries
As historians have become more aware of the heterogeneity of nineteenth-century scientific culture, more attention has been paid to its spatiality as well. It has become clear that if we want to understand who scientific practitioners and audiences were, we need to understand where they went to practice or encounter science. Spatiality matters on a number of different levels. Scientific activity throughout the nineteenth-century was certainly not evenly distributed across the British Isles. 26 Thinking about science's geographical distribution, between metropolis and province and between the islands' nationalities, is essential to making sense of who its practitioners and audiences were. In the metropolis, for example, looking at scientific networks of production and consumption should be central to understanding its cultural as well as its physical geography. Placing science in relation to the world that went on around it can help historians recognize the ways it was understood by participants and audiences alike. When audiences moved around scientific institutions the way that they made sense of the artefacts and performances around them was, in part at least, a product of the ways those things were spatially located and what else was going on in juxtaposition to them. Street with its polite middle class and aristocratic clientele, on the other hand, signified a completely different kind of fashionable London. 30 It seems evident that different scientific institutions were embedded in their own particular networks of consumption. Their location placed them in the world of London entertainment and edification. They were also embedded in networks of production. None of these places could exist without the artisans' workshops and instrument-makers' shops that supported them. Networks of production provided scientific institutions of various kinds with the material and human resources they needed to mount their displays and performances. 31 Networks of consumption dictated, in part at least, Pedagogical locations and spaces were both heterogeneous and increasingly circumscribed. Laboratories -certainly laboratories designed for teaching purposes -were relatively novel spaces at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 33 The movement of apparatus and information from laboratory to lecture theatre can be seen to mirror its transmission from public to private. As Michael Faraday, for example, moved between the basement laboratory at the Royal Institution and the lecture theatre upstairs, he was moving between private and public -and also between contingent and certain knowledge. 34 Teaching regimes and locations dictated particular forms of behaviour as well. As mathematics teaching and examination at Cambridge was reformed between the end of the eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth centuries, moving from public disputation to paper examination, a reform of student manners took place as well. Students were encouraged to exercise their bodies as well as their minds to avoid breakdown. 35 Institutionalized teaching laboratories at
Cambridge and elsewhere were accused of breaching boundaries between politeness and vulgarity. James Clerk Maxwell famously worried that if parents knew he was making their sons work with their hands in a laboratory they would be up in arms. 36 Laboratories appeared to breach what some at least took to be an inviolable barrier between factory and gentlemanly culture.
As was the case with popular science, looking at science's spaces ultimately brings us back again to the politics of knowledge. Space had a great deal to do with defining the epistemological status of scientific knowledge and, as a result, it had a great deal to do with Joseph Priestley, after all, had famously argued that "the English hierarchy (if there be anything unsound in its constitution) has equal reason to tremble, even at an air-pump or an electrical machine." 38 To his political enemies, like Edmund Burke, this was fighting talk.
They were convinced that English natural philosophy was indeed dangerously politically heterodox and that new philosophical enthusiasms like electricity or mesmerism were a means to introduce the Revolution to England through the back door. The result was a fragmentation of established eighteenth century expectations of natural philosophy's social place. At the newly established Royal Institution, which would be a bulwark of elite science throughout the nineteenth century, plans to build a stairway so that the working classes could come in and mingle with their betters in the lecture theatre at least, if not in the lobby, were abruptly abandoned. 39 The spectre of revolution still haunted those who would be England's elite gentlemen of science a generation and more later. The carefully measured utterances of the metropolitan scientific elite on the occasion of the centenary of Priestley's birth in 1833 show just how nervous some of them still were of the chemist's radical reputation. Any hint that celebrating his chemistry might mean endorsing his politics was to be rigorously avoided. 40 Henry
Brougham prissily belittled the reputation of a man "who united in his own person the part of the experimental inquirer after physical truth with that of the angry polemic and the fiery politician." 41 There certainly seems to be a case to be made for the possibility that for some groups of natural philosophers in the aftermath of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the reordering of science and the establishment of new spaces of scientific activity was imperatively a way of disassociating themselves from past linkages that now appeared to have been disastrous. For these people, forging new spaces for science was a way of signalling a decisive break with the past. 42 For others, such as groups of radical artisans, who wanted to attach the mantle of science to themselves, the imperatives were quite different. They wanted to find spaces where they could reassert natural philosophy's radical legacy and turn it into a political tool for new and further battles. 43 It seems not implausible that many of the rancorous manoeuvrings around the banner of scientific reform that occupied metropolitan elites in the Royal Society and elsewhere from the 1820s to the 1850s can be understood as attempts to refound a role for science in relation to the state. practitioner. 44 These dogfights were contests about authority and the legitimacy conferred by being able to show who nature's spokesmen really were. By the beginning of the twentieth century, certain kinds of scientific spaces -the academic research laboratory for examplehad come to characterize what it meant to be scientific. It was through their association with such spaces that groups and individuals could claim mastery over the natural world. 45 That those groups and places won the battle for legitimacy was a matter of contingency.
Throughout the nineteenth century other groups fought to try and make other kinds of spaces scientific too.
Seeing these manoeuvrings against a broader canvas should be able to help us understand better how these battles fell out as they did. Extending the temporal focus to embrace both the French Revolution and the Great War may well turn out to be rather fruitful in terms of allowing us to make sense of our spatial preoccupations too. One particular advantage might be that rethinking temporality will, paradoxically enough, help us do a better 
